The issuer's classic XRPL address.
OptionalamountThe holder's full confidential balance, supplied to skip the (potentially slow) on-ledger decryption. Confidential clawback is all-or-nothing: rippled always burns the holder's entire confidential balance and the proof binds this value to the issuer-encrypted balance ciphertext, so it MUST equal the full balance — a smaller value does not claw back a partial amount, it just produces a proof rippled rejects (tecBAD_PROOF). When omitted, the builder decrypts the issuer-encrypted balance to recover the full amount itself.
The holder whose confidential balance is being clawed back.
OptionalissuerAdvanced: predicted issuer-encrypted balance to prove against, overriding live ledger state. Set by prepareConfidentialBatch when an earlier same-batch inner changed the holder's balance; unset for a standalone clawback.
The issuer's ElGamal keypair.
OptionalledgerAdvanced: the ledger index to read confidential state (balance, version, issuer/auditor keys) from, so a single proof is built from one coherent ledger snapshot. Defaults to the latest validated ledger. prepareConfidentialBatch sets it so every inner shares one ledger; standalone callers normally omit it.
The 24-byte hex MPTokenIssuanceID.
OptionaloutstandingAdvanced: extra headroom for the balance-decrypt search bound over the
issuance's on-ledger ConfidentialOutstandingAmount. Set by
prepareConfidentialBatch to the in-batch Convert total; unset otherwise.
OptionalsequenceOptional explicit sequence number. When omitted the builder queries the
account's current sequence. The returned transaction pins Sequence, so it
must be submitted without re-deriving the sequence (the proof is bound to it).
Inputs for prepareConfidentialClawback.